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Psychologists and philosophers have not yet resolved what 
they take implicit attitudes to be; and, some, concerned about 
limitations in the psychometric evidence, have even 
challenged the predictive and theoretical value of positing 
implicit attitudes in explanations for social behavior. In the 
midst of this debate, prominent stakeholders in science have 
called for scientific communities to recognize and 
countenance implicit bias in STEM fields. In this paper, I 
stake out a stakeholder conception of implicit bias that 
responds to these challenges in ways that are responsive to the 
psychometric evidence, while also being resilient to the sorts 
of disagreements and scientific progress that would not 
undermine the soundness of this call. Along the way, my 
account advocates for attributing collective (group-level) 
implicit attitudes rather than individual-level implicit 
attitudes. This position raises new puzzles for future research 
on the relationship (metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical) 
between collective implicit attitudes and individual-level 
attitudes. 
Keywords: collective implicit attitudes; implicit attitudes; 
implicit bias; science policy; dispositional attitudes; attitudes 
Introduction 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science 
and the National Academies of Science – non-profit 
organizations tasked with advancing science and providing 
science-based advice – have called for scientific 
communities to recognize and countenance implicit bias as 
an impediment on women and minority participation and 
advancement in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) fields (Pinholster, 2016; National 
Academies of Science, 2015). How do we interpret their 
claims about implicit bias in the face of vociferous debate 
about what implicit attitudes are and real limitations to 
canonical methods for measuring them – all while creating 
evidence-based policies that are resilient to the sort of fine-
grained empirical debate and progress that would not 
undermine the soundness of this call?  
In this paper, I will stake out a stakeholder conception of 
implicit bias that finesses two major challenges: (current 
and future) disagreement about what implicit attitudes are, 
and the psychometric limits of the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT).1 While responding to the second challenge, I will 
argue for the notion of collective implicit attitudes and 
identify some of the metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical 
questions they raise for future philosophical inquiry. 
                                                        
1 Because there is more evidence on the discriminant validity of 
implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT as opposed to other 
measures for implicit attitudes, I focus on IAT-related evidence. 
Challenge 1: Disagreement about what Implicit 
Attitudes Are 
Ideally, stakeholders interested in articulating evidence-
based policies do so in ways that create room for scientific 
disagreement about and continued discovery of finer-
grained scientific details that do not impact the soundness of 
the policy. This practical constraint has interesting 
implications on whether stakeholder claims and policies 
should conceptualize implicit attitudes as mental states or as 
dispositions. 
Implicit Attitudes as Mental States 
Social psychologists advocating the mental state approach 
to conceptualizing implicit attitudes have imputed 
competing cognitive accounts of the hidden processes and 
representations that explain how social behavior is 
generated from stimuli in the environment (De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). For mental state view 
advocates, attitudes are evaluative judgments stored in long-
term memory (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) or 
constructed, “on the spot” (Schwarz, 2007, p. 650), in 
working memory (Gawronsky & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
Some mental state theorists advocate for just one kind of 
underlying representation to do this work (Fazio, 2007). 
Others advocate for the existence of two or more 
representations that generate judgments and behavior via 
different but interacting types of processes (Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 
2001). Yet others suggest that the representational base or 
“underlying ingredients” (Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink 
2005, p. 24) from which implicit and explicit attitudes are 
formed are shared, where observed dissociations between 
implicit and explicit attitudes result from different processes 
rather than from different, independently stored 
representations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004). In light of such disagreement, some 
mental state theorists have suggested that the term “attitude” 
could “be used as a general integrative label that subsumes 
any aspect of process that is responsible for positive or 
negative responses toward a given object” (Gawonski & 
Bodenhausen 2007, p. 709, italics mine). Among 
philosophers advocating a mental-state-like view, some 
suggest we add to beliefs a second type of content-laden 
attitude (Gendler, 2008; Levy, 2015; Mandelbaum, 2015; 
Holroyd, 2016). For others, “wheeling in the big gun of a 
new fundamental taxonomical category” (Egan, 2011, pp. 
67-8) may not yet be merited (Kwong, 2012). 
Which of these theories is the right one? The imputation 
of representations and processes is constrained by each 
other: mental representations can only be retrieved and 
generate behavior by means of mental processes (Anderson, 
1976; De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; 
Machery, 2007); and, processes can only be triggered by 
and transform some representations (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995; Lee, 2007). However, because there isn’t 
consensus about either the representations or processes 
involved, the field of possible, empirically permissible 
cognitive theories is large enough that “the same behavioral 
data” can be explained “as multiple processes operating on a 
single representation, one process operating on multiple 
representations, or any admixture of representations and 
processes” (Greenwald & Nosek, 2008, p. 80). Each of these 
cognitive theories – which posit different numbers and types 
of representations and processes – can be made and has 
been made consistent with the observed evidence. “[T]here 
are plausible arguments for any of these positions” 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007, p. 708). 
 From a stakeholder perspective, formulating a policy 
that’s conditioned on a prediction about the longevity or 
superior empirical adequacy of a particular mental 
state/process theory seems unwise. Mental state theories are 
so pervasively underdetermined (Bechtel, 2005) that 
disagreement among empirically adequate cognitive theories 
may be the norm rather than the exception (Greenwald, 
2012). Even if we refrain from drawing a pessimistic 
induction over a longer history of unsettled debates among 
competing mental state theories for other kinds of cognitive 
capacities (Greenwald, 2012; Laudan, 1981), it is important 
to note that psychologists have voiced concerns that 
disagreement among competing cognitive theories of 
implicit attitudes in particular “will never end and should 
never end” (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007, pp. 585-6) and may be 
“impossible to resolve” (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013, p. 3), with analogies drawn to “the 
[unresolved] debate between abstractive and exemplar-
based representations in the cognitive literature” (De 
Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, p. 13).2 
Implicit Attitudes as Dispositions 
From a stakeholder perspective, conceptualizing a policy 
that’s conditioned on a prediction about the longevity or 
superior empirical adequacy of any particular cognitive 
theory in explaining observed and accepted effects is 
unnecessary for their purposes if a dispositional approach to 
conceptualizing implicit attitudes is available instead.3 
According to the dispositional approach, attitudes – and 
implicit attitudes more specifically – are tendencies to 
                                                        
2 Pace Machery (2009), De Houwer et al agree with Barsalou 
that “trying to determine whether people use exemplar or 
abstracted representations is futile” and “cannot be evaluated on 
the basis of behavioral data” (Barsalou, 1990, pp. 61-2). 
3 For more on the relative stability of and agreement about 
psychological effects versus their cognitive explanations, see 
Cummins (1983, 2000). 
cognize and behave towards an object, where these 
tendencies can be (imperfectly) measured through various 
measurement procedures (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; 
Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 
2007; Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). Dispositions are kept 
conceptually separate from and remain agnostic about 
claims about the (number of) representations and processes 
underwriting them (Fazio, 2007; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, 
& van Heerden, 2004). Thus, stakeholders adopting a 
dispositional view would be committing to the idea that 
while there is some mental state(s)/process(es) underwriting 
implicit attitudes, making sense of their policies does not 
require theoretical pre-commitment to any particular 
cognitive theory at the level of mental states/processes.4 
By adopting a dispositional approach, stakeholders would 
be adopting a stance of epistemic modesty. Such a stance 
would not be unique to the stakeholder perspective – as a 
matter of scientific practice, it is also a position that some 
psychological researchers adopt. For example, Alice Eagly 
and Shelly Chaiken propose characterizing attitudes as 
“evaluative tendencies” and “purposefully avoid further 
specification of the inner tendency” since “the description of 
this inner tendency inevitably changes as attitude research 
develops and different theoretical positions emerge, become 
popular, and then may erode” (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007, pp. 
585-6). Anthony Greenwald and Brian Nosek (2008) adopt 
a dispositional approach because they take questions about 
the number of underlying representations and processes to 
be, at present, “empirically irresolvable” (Greenwald et al., 
2009, p. 32). Going all the way back to 1935, when Gordon 
Allport declared the concept of attitude as “the keystone in 
the edifice of American social psychology” (Allport, 1935, 
p. 798), he noted that the only “common thread” running 
through diverging definitions of the concept “attitude” 
(Allport, 1935, p. 805) was the idea that attitudes involved a 
kind of disposition: “a mental and neural state of readiness, 
organized through experience, exerting a directive or 
dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all 
objects and situations with which it is related” (Allport, 
1935, p. 810). 
In general, characterizing attitudes as dispositions does 
not demote the insight or priority of research on the 
psychological basis of the attitude construct (Machery, 
2016) or on psychologists’ and philosophers’ theories about 
the cognitive architecture underwriting those attitudes (for 
just one nice example of this genre at work, see Huebner, 
2016). Nor does it deny the reality of progress in these 
domains of research. Indeed, the purpose of characterizing 
attitudes as dispositions is to provide an account that is 
broad enough to accommodate standard patterns of 
scientific disagreement and growth in these discussions. In 
the natural lifecycle of an interesting effect, second 
generation questions about representations and processes – 
studied by identifying boundary conditions and moderators 
                                                        
4 Note that the dispositional approach does not construe implicit 
attitudes as behaviorist posits since implicit attitudes are 
underwritten by representation-rich processing. 
for the effect (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005; Bechtel, 
2005; Zanna & Fazio, 1982; Fischhoff, 1982) – are fruitful. 
They generate new evidence that informs and constrains 
future cognitive theories (De Houwer, Gawronski, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011) and 
refine our understanding of the original effect (De Houwer, 
Geldof, & De Bruycker, 2005; Gawronski et al., 2008). 
Indeed, a mental state/process theory’s generative role in 
such debate and progress is a critical part of evaluating the 
value of any given cognitive theory (De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2103). As such, stakeholders 
adopting a dispositional approach would not, by any means, 
be discounting the importance of second-generation 
research on community effects (Dasgupta, 2013), context 
effects (for a review see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2008), 
training effects (e.g., Brauer et al., 2012), or the influence of 
competing cognitive processes in conditions where there is 
sufficient cognitive capacity and motivation (e.g., Payne, 
2005; Maddux et al., 2005). Such mental state research 
makes important strides towards elucidating the 
psychological basis of our attitudes – i.e., the 
representations and processes underwriting our evaluative 
tendencies – and the circumstances under which an 
individual’s egalitarian convictions are more likely to be 
reflected in her cognition and behavior. 
Overall, stakeholders interested in articulating evidence-
based policies that can create room for scientific 
disagreement about and continued discovery of finer-
grained scientific details can invoke a dispositional rather 
than mental state conceptualization of implicit attitudes. 
Doing so does not put stakeholders in the awkward position 
of betting on the longevity or superior empirical adequacy 
of any particular mental state/process theory. Moreover, 
such a position allows stakeholders to respect the ways in 
which debates at the level of cognitive theory advance our 
understanding of implicit attitudes. 
Challenge 2: Psychometric Limits of the IAT 
Stakeholders must address a second challenge. Some have 
invoked psychometric evidence to challenge the predictive 
and theoretical value of positing implicit attitudes (Machery 
2016; Oswald et al., 2013). In response, I think stakeholders 
can draw on a fuller suite of the psychometric evidence to 
hold that implicit attitudes are legitimately posited – but, are 
best attributed to groups of cognizers rather than to 
individuals. As such, this position re-interprets the call to 
countenance implicit bias in STEM contexts as a call to 
countenance collective implicit bias. I will identify this 
view’s methodological and meta-methodological rationale, 
its policy implications, and some puzzles it raises about 
implicit attitudes. 
Psychometric Challenges 
When it comes to the construct validity of implicit attitudes, 
the psychometric evidence is quite mixed. The IAT has a 
low test-retest reliability, which may indicate that much of 
the variation in its scores is attributable to random errors of 
measurement rather than to the presence of an underlying 
construct (for a contrary view, see Cunningham, Preacher, 
& Banaji, 2001). The IAT has only small-to-moderate 
predictive validity (Greenwald et al., 2009; Oswald et al., 
2013; Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015). When we look 
beyond the IAT to a fuller set of techniques for measuring 
implicit attitudes, we see that these have low convergent 
validity with each other (Olson & Fazio, 2003; Rudman & 
Kilianski, 2000), which may be interpreted as suggesting 
that there isn’t a shared, underlying construct that they all 
measure. 
On the basis of the evidence above, some have suggested 
that we should reconsider whether to posit implicit attitudes 
at all (Machery, 2016; Oswald et al., 2013) – a position 
standing in direct contrast to the overwhelming view among 
psychologists and philosophers that implicit attitudes exist 
and are sensibly attributed to individual cognizers (for an 
overview, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Brownstein & Saul, 2016a, 2016b). 
In contrast to both these mainstream and radical views, I 
think that stakeholders can hold what may, at first, sound 
like an unusual position: when considering the fuller suite of 
psychometric evidence, stakeholders can support claims 
about the construct validity of implicit attitudes, but only 
when describing and predicting group-level behavior rather 
than individual behavior. 
Discriminant Validity 
The strongest evidence favoring the positing of implicit 
attitudes is evidence of its discriminant validity. This 
evidence tends to be ignored or discounted by those 
adverting to the psychometric evidence to challenge the 
legitimacy of implicit attitudes (Machery, 2016; Oswald et 
al., 2013). To propose a new construct, psychologists must 
bring to bear evidence that distinguishes it from constructs 
already in use (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). As such, much of 
the research on implicit attitudes has focused on their 
discriminant validity in relation to explicit attitudes. Such 
evidence includes low correlations between tests thought to 
measure these different constructs (Krosnick, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2005): meta-analysis measures demonstrate 
that correlations between the IAT and explicit measures 
(designed to measure explicit attitudes) are only small-to-
moderate (Greenwald et al., 2009). Further evidence for 
discriminant validity includes dissociations (Greenwald & 
Nosek, 2008): some factors affect implicit but not explicit 
attitudes (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) while other factors 
have been shown to impact explicit but not implicit attitudes 
(Greenwald et al., 2009). Finally, IAT scores and measures 
for explicit attitudes each predict variance not predicted by 
the other: the predictive validity of IAT scores begins to 
catch up to measures for explicit attitudes when dealing with 
socially sensitive topics and then outperforms measures for 
explicit attitudes in predicting intergroup behavior 
(Greenwald et al., 2009). 
Despite the discriminant validity of IAT scores, the IAT’s 
low-to-moderate test-retest reliability and low-to-moderate 
predictive validity measures mean that IAT scores cannot be 
used diagnostically to predict individual differences in the 
“propensity to discriminate” (Oswald et al., 2013, p. 187) – 
not without risking “undesirably high rates of erroneous 
classifications” (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015, p. 
557). As such, some suggest that IAT scores should be used 
to characterize cognition and behavior at the group or 
societal level (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015).5 
Collective Implicit Attitudes 
Because of limitations in the psychometric evidence, 
stakeholders should adopt the view that implicit attitudes are 
best attributed at the group rather than at the individual 
level. This reinterprets calls to recognize implicit bias in 
STEM as calls to address biases embodied and exhibited by 
collectives. Under this lens, previous questions conceived in 
terms of individuals are reimagined at the explicitly 
collective level: how do collective implicit biases reflect 
unjust social structures – and, what should institutions 
(including stakeholders in STEM) do to address them? As 
such, this collective account of implicit attitude foregrounds 
that “broader conception of attitude that is elastic enough to 
apply. . . to broad patterns of culture” – the conceptual 
“meeting point for discussion and research” between 
psychologists and sociologists (Allport 1935, p. 798). 
This view also raises a number of difficult philosophical 
puzzles. Previous work on collective intentionality has 
grappled with a number of important challenges associated 
with trying to characterize the relationship between 
collective attitudes versus the attitudes of the individuals 
belonging to those groups (Gilbert, 1989; Pettit, 2001, 2007; 
List & Pettit, 2011). The notion of collective implicit 
attitudes raises a number of analogous questions. How 
should we characterize the relationship between collective 
implicit biases versus the attitudes of the individuals 
belonging to those groups? And, what are the ramifications 
of these accounts on assessing the epistemic and moral 
responsibility of the collective versus its individuals? 
Finally, there may be some who remain skeptical about 
whether the psychometric evidence is sufficient to begin 
thinking or talking about launching interventions at all. Note 
that, even if the IAT is not a diagnostically terrific screening 
tool for predicting which individuals will commit 
discriminatory acts, stakeholders can nevertheless adopt 
interventions designed to reduce the overall risk of biased 
behavior, even among groups who do not have high IAT 
scores; and, some interventions may be inexpensive and 
beneficial enough to merit their broad acceptance and 
adoption. To understand how this might be the case, 
consider this analogy to the case of blood pressure. From an 
epidemiological perspective, some take blood pressure 
readings to be a poor screening tool when it comes to 
                                                        
5 Note that IAT scores can still inform the evidence base used to 
characterize individuals; however, they may be best used fruitfully 
towards attributing, not implicit attitudes, but courser-grained 
attitudes like aversive racism (Lee, forthcoming; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2004). 
predicting cardiovascular events such as heart attack or 
stroke (Law, Wald, & Morris, 2003). However, because 
lowering blood pressure is good for decreasing the risk of 
cardiovascular events even among groups without high 
blood pressure, and because the cost of interventions used to 
lower blood pressure are inexpensive and beneficial, it 
makes good sense to implement such interventions broadly 
(for those above a certain age) regardless of their blood 
pressure reading (Law, Wald, & Morris, 2003). 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I staked out a stakeholder conception of 
implicit bias. This position responds to two important 
challenges. First, it navigates debates about whether implicit 
attitudes should be conceptualized as mental states or as 
dispositions by appealing to a form of epistemic modesty 
that is savvy to disagreement and growth in psychological 
research. This allows stakeholder injunctions (to attend to 
implicit bias in scientific communities) to be resilient to 
finer-grained forms of scientific debate and progress that 
would not impact the ultimate soundness of this call. 
Second, it recognizes real strengths and weaknesses in the 
psychometric evidence for implicit attitudes by 
understanding tests for implicit attitudes (in particular, the 
IAT) as tools for characterizing group-level rather than 
individual-level behavior. This position raises rich and 
pressing philosophical questions about how we should 
understand the relationship – metaphysical, epistemic, and 
ethical – between collective implicit attitudes and 
individual-level attitudes. 
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